The Mirage of Demilitarisation

Rethinking DDR and Stabilisation in Gaza.

CIM Policy Report

The Jabalia refugee camp, in northern Gaza, [Photograph by Mahmoud Issa / Reuters]

Executive Summary

As discussions intensify around an international stabilisation force for Gaza and a Trump administration “20-Point Gaza Peace Plan”, the language of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) has moved to the centre of diplomatic debates. A draft UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution tabled by the United States now envisages a two-year international stabilisation force (ISF) mandated to demilitarise Gaza, decommission non-state weapons, and oversee a transitional governance structure under a “Board of Peace” chaired by President Trump.

At first glance, key provisions of the plan resemble contemporary DDR practice: monitored decommissioning, weapons buy-backs, amnesties for disarming combatants, retraining vetted Palestinian police, and the deployment of an international force. However, when we compare this emerging architecture with the UN’s Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) and historical experience in Lebanon, Iraq and other theatres, we see a profound divergence between DDR as understood in international practice and DDR as instrumentalised in the Gaza context.

In this report, we argue that:

• The current approach reverses the normal DDR sequence by demanding far-reaching demilitarisation in the absence of a credible, mutually agreed political settlement or final-status horizon for Palestinians.

• The proposed framework is asymmetric, entrenching one-sided demobilisation of Palestinian actors while leaving the stronger party’s military posture structurally untouched, and tying Israeli withdrawal solely to security benchmarks it largely defines.

• The governance model – a technocratic Palestinian committee under a “Board of Peace” – is closer to international trusteeship than national ownership, contradicting the core DDR principle that sustainable disarmament rests on legitimate, locally anchored institutions. 

• The insistence on a “deradicalised, terror-free zone” as an ultimate condition substitutes zero-risk security absolutism for realistic risk management, creating a permanent pretext for emergency measures and delayed normalisation.

• Regional actors are essentially treated as implementers and guarantors of a US-designed vision, not co-authors of a genuinely regional political compact.

We caution that this combination risks producing a mirage of demilitarisation: a technically sophisticated stabilisation scheme that leaves root political grievances unresolved, fragments armed power rather than consolidating it under legitimate institutions, and burdens regional states with an unmanageable security and political liability.

We recommend a re-sequenced, politics-first approach to DDR in Gaza that:

1. Anchors any demilitarisation roadmap in a credible political horizon, including a broadly endorsed pathway to Palestinian self-determination and accountable governance.

2. Establishes Palestinian legitimacy and representation at the centre of the process, moving from externally chaired trusteeship to progressively empowered Palestinian institutions.

3. Reframes security goals from “terror-free” absolutism to realistic risk reduction, recognising that zero-risk paradigms entrench open-ended exceptionalism.

4. Reconstitutes the proposed ISF and CMCC as UN-mandated, regionally co-authored mechanisms, not merely execution arms of a national political project.

5. Adopts a gradual, modular DDR strategy tailored to Gaza’s conditions – emphasising arms control, community-based violence reduction and institutional reform over one-time, maximalist disarmament.

6. Integrates DDR with transitional justice and economic recovery, recognising that weapons will not permanently disappear from a territory whose population remains besieged, impoverished and politically disenfranchised.

1. Context: Gaza, Ceasefire and the New DDR Debate

Gaza enters this phase of diplomacy amid massive humanitarian devastation, institutional fragmentation, and deep mistrust among all stakeholders. Repeated rounds of war since 2008, the October 2023 escalation, and the prolonged campaign that followed have left basic infrastructure degraded and governance structures contested. UN agencies repeatedly warn of critical shortages of fuel, food and medical supplies, and the collapse of basic services for over 2 million residents.

Against this backdrop, the Trump administration has proposed a 20-Point Gaza Peace Plan. Extracts summarised in the RUSI framing paper highlight three pillars:

• Stabilisation and governance: a temporary International Stabilisation Force (ISF) and a technocratic Palestinian administration overseen by a “Board of Peace”.

• Demilitarisation: destruction and non-reconstruction of “military, terror and offensive infrastructure” and permanent decommissioning of weapons from non-state actors, supported by independent monitors and a buy-back programme.

• Economic reconstruction: an expert-led development plan to rebuild and “empower” Gaza. 

This agenda is now being translated into a draft UNSC resolution proposing a two-year ISF mandate to oversee demilitarisation, protect humanitarian operations, and supervise the transitional arrangements. Parallel efforts have begun to assemble a Civil–Military Coordination Centre (CMCC), with the UK and others already deploying planning officers, even as many potential troop-contributing countries remain hesitant.

The RUSI Issue Framing Paper correctly notes that this constellation has re-energised debates about DDR, verification of decommissioning, and the architecture of local administration and border management in Gaza. It also emphasises that for regional actors – notably Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Türkiye and the Gulf states – the question is not whether to engage, but how to do so without assuming unsustainable liabilities.

It is in this context that DDR has become both the vocabulary of international diplomacy and the terrain of political contestation.

2. DDR in International Practice: Principles and Preconditions

2.1 Core Definitions

In international peace operations, DDR – Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration – is understood as a linked package of measures to help societies transition from war to peace.

According to the UN’s Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) and related guidance:

• Disarmament is the collection, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition and heavy weapons from combatants and often from the civilian population.

• Demobilisation is the formal and controlled discharge of combatants from armed forces or groups, often via cantonment or assembly points, followed by initial support (“reinsertion”).

• Reintegration is the long-term process of ex-combatants acquiring civilian status and sustainable livelihoods within their communities, economically and socially, so they become stakeholders in peace rather than spoilers.

DDR is thus deliberately multidimensional – security, political, humanitarian and socio-economic at once.

2.2 Political Logic and National Ownership

The UN’s own guidance is explicit: DDR is not a mechanical security fix but a political instrument embedded in a wider peace process. The IDDRS stress that DDR programmes are ideally part of comprehensive peace agreements and national transition frameworks, usually in contexts where peace operations are mandated to support nationally led DDR efforts.

Key principles include:

• Political settlement: DDR should flow from a negotiated political compact, not substitute for one.

• National ownership: national authorities – however imperfect – must be primary drivers, with the UN and partners providing support, not direction.

• Inclusivity and balance: where multiple armed actors exist, DDR should aim to address them coherently, even if sequencing is asymmetric.

• Linkage to SSR and justice: DDR sits alongside security sector reform (SSR) and, increasingly, transitional justice mechanisms; the combination shapes whether ex-combatants see a stake in the new order.

2.3 Lessons from Lebanon, Iraq and Beyond

Historical experience offers instructive parallels and warnings:

• Lebanon (post-Taif Agreement): the 1989 Taif Accord ended the civil war and mandated disbandment of militias, combined with amnesty and partial integration of fighters into state institutions. Yet some groups – notably Hezbollah and certain Palestinian factions – were exempted from full disarmament, leaving a hybrid security order that persists.

• Iraq (post-2003): the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority’s de-Baathification and disbanding of the Iraqi army became a textbook example of how not to combine demobilisation and political exclusion. Sweeping purges and the collapse of state security structures fuelled insurgency, communal polarisation and the rise of new extremist actors.

• Other contexts (e.g. Liberia, Sierra Leone, Yemen) highlight the dangers of designing DDR without realistic funding, without community buy-in, or without addressing structural drivers of violence such as marginalisation and impunity.

Across these cases, one lesson stands out: DDR works when it is rooted in a credible political horizon and legitimate institutions. Where it is perceived as victor’s justice, collective punishment or externally imposed social engineering, it tends to shift violence into new forms rather than ending it.

3. The Emerging Gaza Framework: DDR Language, Different Logic

The Trump 20-Point Gaza Plan and the supporting UNSC draft resolution incorporate several recognisable DDR features:

• Demilitarisation & decommissioning: complete destruction of non-state “military, terror and offensive infrastructure” and permanent decommissioning of weapons from Hamas and other factions, under independent monitoring and international funding for buy-backs and reintegration. 

• Amnesty and safe passage: provisions for amnesty or safe exit to third countries for Hamas members who disarm and commit to peaceful coexistence. 

• International force: a temporary International Stabilisation Force (ISF) mandated to oversee demilitarisation, maintain security, train vetted Palestinian police, and coordinate with Israel and Egypt on borders.

• Transitional governance: a technocratic Palestinian committee to run day-to-day affairs, supervised by a “Board of Peace” chaired by Trump and including selected international figures. 

• Economic reconstruction: an expert-driven development package to rebuild Gaza and attract investment. 

On the surface, this looks like a robust DDR-cum-stabilisation concept. But its underlying political logic and institutional design diverge sharply from standard DDR doctrine.

4. Where the Gaza Plan Aligns with DDR Orthodoxy

We should acknowledge areas of convergence, both to be fair and to identify building blocks worth retaining:

1. Instrumental toolkit:

   The use of monitored decommissioning, buy-backs, amnesty, reintegration support and security force vetting is squarely within the modern DDR toolbox.

2. Recognition of reintegration and economic needs:

   The plan links demilitarisation to economic reconstruction, implicitly recognising that sustainable disarmament requires livelihoods and hope. This reflects hard-won DDR lessons from other post-conflict settings.

3. Integration with an international presence:

   Combining DDR measures with a temporary international force is consistent with many mission contexts where UN or regional operations provide security guarantees and operational support to national DDR programmes.

These are not trivial points: they indicate that the language and instruments of DDR are being taken seriously. The difficulty lies not in the tools, but in the architecture into which they are inserted.

5. The Mirage of Demilitarisation: Critical Departures

5.1 Reversed Sequencing: Demilitarisation Before Politics

In orthodox DDR practice, we disarm because there is a political settlement, not in the abstract hope that one will follow. In Gaza, the sequence is largely inverted:

• The plan demands comprehensive demilitarisation and structural changes overseen by an ISF and a “Board of Peace” as preconditions for normalisation.

• Only at Point 20 do we find a commitment that the US “will establish a dialogue” to agree on a political horizon for coexistence. 

At the same time, fighting has not meaningfully ended. The ceasefire remains fragile and frequently violated, and core questions of sovereignty, territory and rights are unresolved.

From a DDR standpoint, this is structurally problematic. It risks turning demilitarisation into coerced pacification in the absence of political guarantees, rather than a negotiated step within a shared project of state-building.

5.2 Asymmetry and One-Sided Demobilisation

The plan’s demilitarisation requirements explicitly target Palestinian armed actors, while Israeli military power is neither reduced nor subject to parallel DDR-type constraints.

Israeli withdrawal from Gaza is contingent on the ISF achieving certain demilitarisation benchmarks and security standards, with any residual “security perimeter presence” potentially extended if threats persist. 

This level of structural asymmetry is not unheard of – many peace processes reflect power realities – but it carries familiar risks:

• It frames DDR as a unilateral act of surrender rather than a mutual transition.

• It can incentivise armed groups to fragment and go underground rather than disarm transparently.

• It entrenches the perception of DDR as a tool of domination rather than peace.

Iraq’s experience with de-Baathification illustrates how a process perceived as punitive and one-sided can undermine the legitimacy of the entire post-war order, fuelling long-term instability.

5.3 Trusteeship vs. National Ownership

At the heart of the proposed governance architecture lies a striking contradiction with DDR principles of national ownership:

• Day-to-day governance is entrusted to a “technocratic, apolitical Palestinian committee”.

• Strategic oversight and funding, however, are vested in an international “Board of Peace” chaired by Trump and including selected international figures. 

This resembles a form of international trusteeship or mandate, with Gazans reduced to administrators of policies designed and supervised externally. UN DDR doctrine, by contrast, emphasises that disarmament and demobilisation should be undertaken by national institutions with international support, not the other way around.

Such trusteeship-style arrangements risk creating a legitimacy deficit at the very core of the institutions that DDR is supposed to strengthen.

5.4 The “Deradicalised, Terror-Free Zone” Paradigm

The plan’s opening demand that Gaza become a “deradicalised terror-free zone” that poses no threat to its neighbours sets an absolute security condition. 

From a DDR and stabilisation perspective, this is problematic in at least three ways:

• It sets the bar for “success” at zero risk, which is unrealistic in any post-conflict setting.

• It normalises the idea that any residual or renewed violence justifies prolonged exceptional measures, including an extended ISF, Israeli security perimeters, or ongoing restrictions on movement and politics.

• It frames the entire process as managing Palestinian threats, rather than building a balanced security architecture in which all sides accept constraints.

DDR experience elsewhere teaches us that the aim should be manageable risk and credible deterrence, not fantasy notions of total deradicalisation.

5.5 Justice and Accountability Gaps

Point 6’s offer of amnesty and safe passage for disarming Hamas members is not inherently inconsistent with DDR; amnesties are often used – controversially – to encourage rank-and-file fighters to lay down arms. 

However, in the current Gaza framework:

• There is no articulated transitional justice architecture addressing grave violations by any actor.

• Victims’ rights, truth-seeking and reparations are largely absent from the public debate, even as civilian casualties and destruction remain staggering.

DDR that divorces demilitarisation from justice risks being seen as impunity for the useful rather than a step towards reconciliation.

5.6 Regional Actors as Implementers, Not Co-Authors

Regional powers – including Qatar, Egypt, Jordan, Türkiye and Gulf states – are central to any realistic Gaza stabilisation process. The current discourse increasingly casts them as:

• Troop contributors to a US-designed ISF;

• Donors to an economic reconstruction plan;

• Hosts for potential safe-passage recipients and political initiatives.

Yet they are not clearly empowered as co-designers of the political framework, including the terms of demilitarisation, governance and eventual Palestinian statehood. This imbalance undermines regional ownership and increases the risk that the ISF and DDR process are perceived domestically as outsourced enforcement of an externally imposed political order.

6. Gaza-Specific Constraints on DDR

Beyond conceptual issues, Gaza presents structural conditions that make conventional DDR extremely challenging:

1. Fragmented security landscape:

   While Hamas has historically held de facto control, other factions, clans and armed networks exist. Any DDR process that focuses narrowly on Hamas without addressing the broader ecosystem risks fragmentation and splintering.

2. Humanitarian catastrophe:

   With critical infrastructure destroyed and widespread displacement and trauma, the basic conditions for socio-economic reintegration are weak. Ex-combatants without real alternative livelihoods are more likely to drift into criminality or renewed militancy.

3. Political representation crisis:

   Palestinian politics is deeply divided between Gaza and the West Bank, and between factions. A technocratic committee under an external Board may manage services, but it will not resolve the deeper question: who legitimately speaks for Gaza in negotiations and in the new security architecture?

4. Israeli security doctrine:

   Israel has historically insisted on maintaining strategic freedom of action vis-à-vis Gaza, including airspace control, periodic incursions and tight border regulations. DDR that fails to translate demilitarisation into meaningful easing of closure and guarantees against renewed large-scale operations will struggle to win local support.

5. Regional and global geopolitics:

   The Gaza file is now entangled with regional rivalries and global power competition, including the roles of Iran, the US, Europe, Russia and others. Any ISF and DDR model must navigate these overlapping agendas, which complicate decision-making in both the UNSC and regional capitals.

These realities underscore why copy-pasting DDR templates into Gaza will not work. The approach must be tailored to the territory’s unique combination of siege, occupation, internal fragmentation and regional salience.

7. Pathways Forward: Principles and Recommendations

In light of the above, we propose a set of principles and concrete suggestions for reshaping DDR and stabilisation efforts in Gaza into a realistic, politically grounded agenda.

7.1 Put Politics First

• Reframe sequencing: Rather than treating demilitarisation as the gateway to political dialogue, the UNSC and key mediators should link any DDR roadmap explicitly to a time-bound political horizon, including benchmarks towards recognised Palestinian self-determination and representation.

• Integrate Gaza into a broader political track: DDR in Gaza should be nested in a wider process addressing the West Bank, Jerusalem and final-status issues, to avoid cementing Gaza as a permanently exceptional enclave.

7.2 Centre Palestinian Legitimacy and Representation

• From trusteeship to partnership: If a transitional governance mechanism is unavoidable, its design should be time-limited, clearly transitional and progressively devolved to Palestinian institutions endorsed through some form of internal process (elections or an agreed representative body).

• Avoid over-technocratisation: Technocrats are vital, but technocracy cannot substitute for politics. DDR will only endure if those implementing it are perceived as legitimate representatives, not as externally appointed managers.

7.3 Recalibrate Security Goals

• From “terror-free” to risk-managed: Replace absolutist language of “deradicalised, terror-free Gaza” with a realistic commitment to risk reduction and deterrence, with measurable but achievable indicators.

• Link demilitarisation to tangible gains: Every step in the demilitarisation process should be tied to visible improvements in movement, economic opportunity, and protection from collective punishment for the civilian population.

7.4 Redesign the ISF and CMCC as Genuine Multilateral Mechanisms

• UN mandate and regional co-authorship: The ISF should, as far as possible, be UN-mandated, with a mandate negotiated not only between Washington and a handful of capitals but with meaningful input from regional states and Palestinian interlocutors.

• Clear command and accountability structures: The ISF’s rules of engagement, oversight mechanisms and exit strategy must be transparent. Without this, it risks being seen as a proxy occupation force rather than a neutral stabilisation body.

• Burden-sharing and consent: No regional state should be pressured into deployments that lack domestic legitimacy or clear political goals. Troop contributions must be grounded in a shared political concept, not ad hoc bargaining.

7.5 Tailor DDR to Gaza’s Realities

Instead of a maximalist, one-off demilitarisation push, we recommend a modular, phased DDR strategy:

• Arms control and registration: Begin with weapons registration, storage and control schemes, coupled with targeted collection of heavy and long-range systems that most directly threaten neighbours.

• Community-based violence reduction (CVR): Deploy programmes that combine arms reduction with local safety initiatives, job creation and youth engagement, as suggested in updated UN DDR approaches for non-mission settings.

• Security sector reform: Focus early on building accountable, vetted Palestinian policing structures, supported but not dominated by the ISF, with clear human rights and due-process standards.

• Engage all relevant actors: Design DDR mechanisms that recognise the plurality of armed actors in Gaza and avoid creating incentives for splinter groups to sabotage the process.

7.6 Embed DDR in Justice and Accountability

• Hybrid transitional justice: Pair amnesty provisions for rank-and-file combatants with mechanisms that address serious violations of international law, by all sides, through some combination of national, international or hybrid processes.

• Victim-centred approaches: Ensure that DDR and stabilisation funding includes support for victims, documentation of abuses, and psychosocial programmes, signalling that peace is not simply a deal among elites and armed men.

7.7 Tie Economic Reconstruction to Rights and Access

• Beyond “Dubai-fication”: Commit to an economic agenda that is not merely about flagship projects but about restoring normal economic life – access to external markets, freedom of movement for labour and goods, and predictable legal frameworks for investment.

• Conditionality linked to mutual obligations: Structure economic support in a way that rewards compliance on both sides – including steps by Israel to relax closure and by Palestinian authorities to uphold non-violence and accountability.

8. Conclusion: From Mirage to Substance

The emerging Gaza stabilisation framework, built around an International Stabilisation Force and a 20-Point Plan, is not devoid of serious thinking. It incorporates many of the instruments that have become standard in DDR and post-conflict programming.

Yet, from our perspective at the Council on International Mediation, it currently offers more of a mirage of demilitarisation than a pathway to sustainable peace.

We see a sophisticated technical edifice erected on an unstable foundation:

• Demilitarisation is demanded before political rights and horizons are clarified.

• National ownership is replaced by a form of trusteeship that risks leaving Palestinians as objects, not authors, of the process.

• Regional actors are asked to underwrite and enforce a plan they did not design, at potentially high domestic and strategic cost.

• The humanitarian and economic collapse of Gaza is acknowledged but not structurally integrated into DDR design, leaving reintegration strategies dangerously thin.

We therefore urge all actors – the United States, regional states, the UN, European partners, Israel and Palestinian representatives – to treat DDR not as a technical fix or a checkbox for a UNSC resolution, but as an instrument that must be re-anchored in a credible political project and genuine local ownership.

Real demilitarisation will not come from perfecting verification protocols or drafting ever more detailed mandates. It will come when the people of Gaza see that laying down arms is not the prelude to another form of control, but the opening of a different future – one in which they possess both security and rights.

Until then, we risk stabilising not peace, but the appearance of order.

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